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ABSTRACT
A well-known approach for collaborative spam filtering is to
determine which emails belong to the same bulk, e.g. by
exploiting their content similarity. This allows, after ob-
serving an initial portion of a bulk, for the bulkiness scores
to be assigned to the remaining emails from the same bulk.
This also allows the individual evidence of spamminess to be
joined, if such evidence is generated by collaborating filters
or users for some of the emails from an initial portion of
the bulk. Usually a database of previously observed emails
or email digests is formed and queried upon receiving new
emails.
Previous evaluations [2, 10] of the approach based on the
email digests that preserve email content similarity indicate
and partially demonstrate that there are ways to make the
approach robust to increased obfuscation efforts by spam-
mers. However, for the settings of the parameters that pro-
vide good matching between the emails from the same bulk,
the unwanted random matching between ham emails and
unrelated ham and spam emails stays rather high. This
directly translates into a need for use of higher bulkiness
thresholds in order to ensure low false positive (FP) detec-
tion of ham, which implies that larger initial parts of spam
bulks will not be filtered, i.e. true positive (TP) detection
will not be very high (FP-TP conflict).
In this paper we demonstrate how, by use of the neg-
ative selection algorithm, the unwanted random matching
between unrelated emails may be decreased at least by an
order of magnitude, while preserving the same good match-
ing between the emails from the same bulk. We also show
how this translates into an order of magnitude (at least)
of less undetected bulky spam emails, under the same ham
miss-detection requirements.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Importance of Digest-Based Collaborative
Spam Detection
There are two big groups of techniques for collaborative
communication filtering in the Internet (including the email
filtering): those based on the source of the communica-
tion and those based on the content of the communication.
The techniques from the first group try to determine how
good or reputed the source of a communication is. Based
on this evaluation the communication is either protected
(white listed), or blocked, or given a score that is combined
with other antispam techniques for the final filtering deci-
sion. The reputation is usually determined for sender IDs,
source IP addresses or Internet domains. Concrete examples
are PGP-based trust and authentication for email addresses
[5], Spamhouse’s real-time black lists of IP addresses from
which large amount of spam is sent [11], Gmail’s reputation
of Internet domains from which emails are sent [12].
The techniques from the first group are however able to fil-
ter only the communication from the sources already learned
to be good or bad, though in practice it is often needed
to accept and filter new communications from the users or
sources for which such a reputation is not yet built. Regard-
ing email, the white and black lists are usually applied first
as they are both fast and allow pre-filtering the email stream
already at the connection level, which is good for lowering
the usage of the communication resources. However, due to
the use of dynamic domains and botnets by spammers, sig-
nificant amount of spam is not blocked by black lists. Use
of additional spam filtering techniques, such are those based
on email content, is still needed.
Collaborative detection of bad content seems to be es-
pecially appropriate for detecting and blocking bulk spam
(most of spam is sent in bulk). It allows for a relatively early
detection of new bulks that contain not previously observed
spam message (phrase).
1.2 FP-TP Conflict And Need To Lessen It
In content-based collaborative spam detection, usually a
database of previously observed emails or email digests is
formed, and queried upon receiving new emails. This al-
lows, after observing an initial portion of a bulk, for the
bulkiness scores to be assigned to the remaining emails from
the same bulk. Spam will be distinguished by having ”many
(more then a threshold) similar emails have been observed”
score, while a ham query should score ”less then the (same)
threshold similar emails has been observed”. This also al-
lows the individual evidence of spamminess to be joined, if
such evidence is generated by collaborating filters or users
for some of the emails from an initial portion of the bulk.
A good source of the evidence of spamminess, which is in-
creasingly used in practice, are the emails tagged as spam
by those users that have and use a ”delete-as-spam” button
in their email-reading program. Automated and probabilis-
tic tagging is also possible, e.g. by use of Bayesian filters’
scores, or by use of ”honey pot” email accounts that are not
associated to real users but only serve to attract unsolicited
bulk emails.
It should be mentioned that if the collaborative spam de-
tection is based purely on the evaluation of bulkiness, each
recipient should be equipped with a white lists of all the
bulky sources from which she or he wants to receive emails.
If trustworthy spamminess reports are used, the scheme may
be usable even without the white lists.
Whether some of the previously observed emails are tagged
as spam or not, for the collaborative detection to work it is
necessary to have a good technique for determining similar-
ity between the emails and find which emails (probably) be-
long to the same bulk, i.e. spam emails from the same bulk
should ”match” each other with a high probability, and ham
emails should with a high probability not match unrelated
ham and spam emails.
It has been indicated and partially demonstrated [2, 10]
that collaborative spam bulk detection by use of similar-
ity digest may be efficient even under strong obfuscation
by spammer, i.e. when the spammer modifies the different
copies from a bulk in order to hide their mutual similarity
from the automated tools. However, the same evaluations
suggest that for the settings of the parameters that provide
good matching between the emails from the same bulk, the
unwanted random matching between ham emails and unre-
lated ham and spam emails stays pretty high. This directly
translates into a need for use of higher bulkiness thresholds
in order to ensure low false positive (FP) detection of ham,
which implies that larger initial parts of spam bulks will not
be filtered, i.e. true positive (TP) detection will not be very
high (FP-TP conflict).
The above facts suggest need for use of additional algo-
rithms (as opposed to simple counting of similar digests in
the database), in order to lessen the FP-TP conflict and
make the technique more useful.
1.3 Nilsimsa Hashing For Determining Simi-
larity Between Emails
Single digest per email. The open-digest technique
from the OD-paper represents an email by a 256-bits di-
gest. The transformation is performed using Nilsimsa hash-
ing [4]. This is a locally sensitive hash function, in sense
that small changes in the original document may impact
only few bits of the digest. That means that similar docu-
ments will have similar digests, in sense of a small Hamming
distance between them. With the standard hash functions
small changes in the original document usually result in a
digest that is completely different from the digest of the
original document.
Nilsimsa Hashing. OD-paper gives a detailed descrip-
tion of the Nilsimsa hashing. In summary, a short sliding
window is applied through the email. For each position of
the window, the trigrams from the window are identified
that consist of the letters from the predefined window posi-
tions (that are close to each other, but not only consecutive-
letters trigrams are used). The collected trigrams are trans-
formed, using a standard hash, to the positions between 1
and 256, and the accumulators at the corresponding posi-
tions are incremented. Finally, the accumulators are com-
pared to the mean or to the median of all the accumulators,
and the bits of the digest are set to 0 or 1, depending on
whether the corresponding accumulators are bellow or above
the mean (or median).
Such digest are often called ”open digests” because: a)
the digests computation method is assumed to be publicly
known; b) the used similarity hashing hides original email
text, so the privacy of the content is preserved even if the
digests are openly exchanged for collaborative filtering.
Nilsimsa Compare Value (NCV) between two digests
is defined to be equal to the number of the equal bits at
the same positions in the two digests, minus 128 (for the
digests of 256 bits). We use NCV as the measure of the
similarity of the two emails from which the two digests are
produced1. The higher NCV indicates the higher similarity
of the texts from which the digest are computed. NCV of
two random unrelated text-strings is random and centered
around 0. Distribution of NCV for two readable (meaning-
ful) but unrelated texts from the same language is slightly
shifted to the right (in our examples centered around 30).
If the texts are related (contain similar or identical parts)
NCV takes values considerably higher then 30, and if the
texts are completely identical NCV is equal to 128.
Digests produced from randomized-position fixed-
length samples. In our recent paper [10] paper we demon-
strate that using multiple digests produced from the randomized-
position and fixed-length samples is more resistant to obfus-
cation then use of the above explained single hash, regarding
spam bulk detection under an interesting and practical ob-
fuscation model2. In the same paper we explain that such di-
gests should also be beneficial under other obfuscation mod-
els, though that is not demonstrated experimentally.
Email-to-email NCV. In order to evaluate similarity
between two emails when multiple digests per email are
used, we define in [10] the NCV between two emails to be
the maximum NCV over all the pairs of the digests between
the two compared emails. Such defined email-to-email NCV
shows how similar are the most similar parts in the two
emails. We use the same email-to-email NCV similarity
measure in this paper.
1.4 FP-TP Conflict And Existing Techniques
For Content-Based Bulk Spam Detection
Here we list the techniques that are known to us to use
similarity digests and that are evaluated in the scientific
literature. Simple counting of the recently observed digests
in a common queried database using single hash per email
is evaluated by Damiani et al. in the well known and often
cited OD-paper [2], and recently revised by us in [10]. In
[10] we also evaluate the same case but with randomized-
position and fixed-length digests (multiple per email).
Zhou et al. [13] design and evaluate a peer-to-peer digest-
based system for collaborative spam detection, which also
uses randomized-position and fixed-length digests. However,
it uses exact instead similarity matching when comparing
1NCV is first defined and used in open-digest paper [2].
2We considered addition of random text to the original spam
message, the case that is often observed in practice.
the digests (as required for hash based routing used by their
system to work).
We first introduce the idea of using multiple email di-
gests and negative selection together in [8]. The system that
we design and evaluate in [9] produces multiple digests per
email, from the strings of fixed length, sampled at random
email positions, and it uses similarity matching. Addition-
ally, it uses artificial immune system algorithms to process
the digests before and after exchanging them with other col-
laborating systems, in order to control which digests will be
activated and used for filtering of the incoming emails.
The previously mentioned FP-TP conflict due to the ran-
dom matching between unrelated emails remains in effect
in all these approaches. Actually, in [9] we use the nega-
tive selection algorithm to lessen the effect of this conflict,
but as the algorithm is used in interplay with other artifi-
cial immune system algorithms and the factorial analysis is
missing, the effect of the negative selection algorithm itself
is not clarified.
1.5 Our Approach For Lessening FP-TP Con-
flict And Contributions of This Paper
In this paper we follow our suggestion from [10] and eval-
uate the impact of the negative selection on lessening the
FP-TP conflict (FP-TP conflict is explained in Section 1.2).
Use of negative selection algorithm in this case3 simply
means that the digests from the newly received emails are
first compared to a database of the digests created from a
representative set of good emails (so called SELF database),
and those that match any of the SELF database digests are
deleted, and only the remaining digests are used for query-
ing the collaborative database of previously observed digests
(Figure 1).
Figure 1: Adding negative selection to the detection
process
In our experiments we form the SELF set by taking ran-
domly a number of good emails from a part of the used ham
corpus (the other two ham corpus parts are used for simu-
lating incoming ham that is to be filtered and for simulating
the digests that are created from previously observed emails
and still present in the collaborative-detection database).
In practice SELF could be automatically updated (e.g. the
emails we send and reply to could be used to update the
SELF set).
3Negative Selection is a well known AIS algorithm, e.g. see
[3], [9]; AIS stands for Artificial Immune Systems, which are
the systems built using the concepts and algorithms inspired
by the models of the human immune system.
We consider the case of collaborative spam bulk detec-
tion that uses multiple digests produced from the strings of
fixed length sampled at randomized positions within email,
because this is shown [10] to be more resistant to increased
spam obfuscation then using single digest per email (for the
considered spammer model). We consider the same spam-
mer model as the one used in [10], i.e. addition of random
text to the original spam message, but we also explain the
expected results for other interesting spammer models.
We perform the same experiment as the one used in [10],
but both with and without use of negative selection. We
evaluate spam bulk detection by estimating the probabil-
ity for the emails from the same bulk to match each other,
and we evaluate miss-detection of good emails by evaluating
the probability for ham emails to match unrelated ham and
spam emails.
Examples of digests that could cause unwanted ham to
”unrelated” emails matching, and that the negative selec-
tion is expected to eliminate, are the digests produced from
sender’s email-client information and used email-formatting
information, which are often present in email headers, or the
digest produced from the interesting textual content that is
being epidemically forwarded to the friends (ham examples
may also be dynamically collected, e.g. from authenticated
and reputable users). There are also some standard phrases
that are often used in the good emails (introductory parts
and salutations).
We demonstrate that by use of the negative selection al-
gorithm the unwanted random matching between unrelated
emails may by decreased at least by an order of magnitude,
while preserving the same good matching between the emails
from the same bulk. We also show how this translates into
an order of magnitude (at least) less undetected bulky spam
emails, under the same ham miss-detection requirements.
1.6 How Our Approach is Different from Cloud-
mark’s "negative assertion"
Prakash and O’Donnell [7] describe a digest-based repu-
tation system called CNC (Cloudmark Network Classifier).
CNC assumes that some users protected by the system re-
port about the received emails whether they are spam or
not. A reputation of the reporters is maintained and used
to aggregate the reports on the same signatures (the sys-
tem uses exact matching between the similarity-preserving
signatures). The reporting of non-spam messages in their
system is called ”negative assertion”. The negative asser-
tion is used with the purpose of avoiding false detections of
bulky good email.
The main difference between CNC and our our approach
is in the fact that CNC does not process the signatures lo-
cally before submitting them to the central database and
our system does. While the ”negative assertion” declares
all the signatures from one email as spammy or normal, our
approach is more precise in that it selects (by use of nega-
tive selection) which signatures should be used further, and
additionally processes them (creation and local processing
of antibodies) before deciding to exchange them for collab-
orative filtering. This difference is important because there
are some email parts that may often be similar in both good
and bad emails (as discussed in the previous section), that
spammers may even intentionally add to the spam emails in
order to pollute the system. Our system is able to remove
such email parts from further processing, and thus isolate
and more precisely process the specific email content.
Figure 2: Experiment without/with negative selection. The experiment determines the probabilities of matching
between ham or spam emails and the emails from the collaborative-detection database DB. If the negative selection step is
used, some of the digests from some emails will be deleted before comparing the email to the database. We also look at the
NCV histograms in order to better understand what happens without/with negative selection. The ni (i = 1, 2, 3) and m are the
number of emails used in the comparisons (in this experiment these values are set to 20).
2. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF NEG-
ATIVE SELECTION
In this section we give additional details of the approach
and its experimental evaluation introduced in Section 1.5.
The code used for performing the experiments is available
on the web [1].
2.1 Experiments Setup
The performed experiments (with and without use of neg-
ative selection) are illustrated in Figure 2.
The experiments determine the probabilities of match-
ing between ham or spam emails and the emails from the
collaborative-detection database DB. More precisely, each
of n1 ham emails (that simulate newly received emails) is
compared to each of n2 ham and m spam emails from the
collaborative-detection database DB, in order to estimate
the probability of matching between newly received ham
emails and unrelated ham and spam email digests previ-
ously observed (within a time window) by the collaborative-
detection database DB (we assume the DB does not a pri-
ori know which digests are spam and which are not, and it
stores all of them). Also, each of m spam emails is compared
to one obfuscated copy in DB database that originates from
the same original spam message (two obfuscated copies from
the same bulk), in order to estimate the probability of spam
emails to match other spam emails from the same bulk. We
used ni,m = 20. For all estimated probabilities we also
compute confidence intervals. In Section 2.3 we show how
these estimated email-to-email matching probabilities may
be translated into ham miss-detection and spam bulk detec-
tion ratios.
The emails are selected randomly from the correspond-
ing databases. Spam emails are optionally obfuscated (as
specified in Section 1.5). The comparison is on the level of
similarity digests and is expressed in form of email-to-email
NCV (this similarity measure is defined in Section 1.3). We
recall here that we generate multiple digests per email, the
number of which is not fixed due to the randomized sampling
of the email text.
Optionally, negative selection is applied to remove some of
the email digests before comparing that email to the emails
from the database DB. The negative selection is aimed at
removing those digests that show tendency to match the
digests from good emails, i.e. they are removed if they
match any of the SELF-database digests (SELF-database
digests are produced from emails known to be ham). If all
digests would happen to be removed, the message could not
be judged by this method. This could happen for messages
with a very short content part, or for image spam. This is
however expected to be unlikely to happen for bulky textual
spam that we consider in our experiments.
In all experiments we use the detection NCV threshold 90,
and when the negative selection is applied we use the nega-
tive selection NCV threshold 50. We choose these values as
they provide representative results, but we do not optimize
them.
Evaluation Metrics. In addition to estimating email-
to-email matching probabilities, we also show the histogram
of email-to-email NCVs (in the case of spam-detection eval-
uation, we account only for comparisons against the emails
from the same bulk - otherwise bulk-matching results would
be masked by unrelated-emails-matching results). Histograms
are useful for understanding what exactly happens with the
digests and for explaining the results.
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Figure 3: Impact of Negative Selection on miss-detection of ham: NCV histograms of (unwanted) random
matching of ham emails to emails in the collaborative-detection database DB.
2.2 Results Discussion
2.2.1 Impact of Negative Selection on Ham Miss-
Detection
From Figures 3(a) and 3(b) we can see that, when the
negative selection is not used, the histogram of the NCV
values between ham emails and unrelated ham and spam
emails is very wide and have a tail in the right part of the
figures, which explains the high values of the probability of
(unwanted) matching between the ham emails and unrelated
ham and spam emails (dashed green line of the Figure 4).
From Figures 3(a), 3(b) and 4 we can also see that the ob-
fuscation doesn’t impact the the probability of (unwanted)
matching between the ham emails and unrelated ham and
spam emails.
From Figures 3(c) and 3(d) we can see that, upon applying
the negative selection, most of the ham digests that cause
unwanted matching between the ham emails and unrelated
ham and spam emails are deleted (remaining NCV similarity
between unrelated emails is bellow the detection threshold).
Actually we observe no matching between ham emails and
unrelated ham and spam emails from the database DB (solid
red line of the Figure 4) overlaps with x axes). However,
when one type of output is not observed in repeated binary
experiment (in our case matching of unrelated emails upon
applying the negative selection), that doesn’t mean that the
probability of that event is zero. It might be very low to
be detected with a relatively small number of experiment
repetitions. The upper value of the 95% confidence interval
to which the real value of the probability belongs may be
computed using the following formula [6]:
CIupper = 1− (α/2)(1/n) [1]
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Figure 4: Impact of Negative Selection on miss-
detection of ham: The probability of (unwanted)
random matching of ham emails to emails in the
collaborative-detection database DB drops signifi-
cantly when the negative selection is applied.
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Figure 5: Impact of negative selection on detection of spam bulk: NCV histograms of matching spam emails
to the emails from the same bulk.
In our case α = 0.05 (as we want to compute 95% confi-
dence interval), and n = 800 (as we compare 20 ham emails
to 40 emails from the database DB). We obtain CIupper =
0.0046. The lower limit of the confidence interval is equal
to 0. In order to more precisely estimate the real value
of the probability, larger number of comparisons should be
performed. However the determined CI already shows that
negative selection causes a large decrease of the probability
for ham emails to match unrelated ham and spam emails
from DB.
2.2.2 Impact of Negative Selection on Spam Bulk De-
tection
From Figure 5(a) we see that even under strong obfus-
cation (ratio=800%) the matching between the emails from
the same bulk is very strong (high email-to-email NCV val-
ues), i.e. the considered digests are very resistant to the
increased obfuscation (this is the finding of our previous pa-
per [10] that we repeat here for the reason of comparison of
the results without and with negative selection).
From Figure 5(b) we see that turning on the negative se-
lection does not have visible effects on the matching between
the spam emails from the same bulk.
For the used detection NCV thereshold 90, in cases with
and without negative selection, all observed email-to-email
NCV values are above the threshold and the observed match-
ing ratio is equal to 1 (so we do not plot this value).
2.3 Transforming (estimated) Email-to-email
Matching Probabilities Into FP and TP
To determine whether an email is spam or not based on
its observed bulkiness, the number of the emails that it
matched in the database DB should be compared to a bulk-
iness threshold. If this number is above the threshold, that
is indication the email is probably spam, else it is probably
ham.
If the number of the emails in the database DB is equal
to N, and the probability of matching between a ham and
un unrelated ham or spam email is equal to p, and assum-
ing the result of email comparisons between a ham email and
the emails from the database are approximately independent
and identically distributed binary variables, the probability
of the query score for a ham email to be above the bulkiness
threshold th, which is at the same time the probability of
miss-detection of ham emails, is equal to:
FP = 1−BinoCdf(th,N, p), [2]
where BinoCdf is the well known binomial cumulative dis-
tribution function.
For example if we consider the case of N=100000, for the
two values of p that we obtained in the performed exper-
iments (see Figure 4): p1=0.1 without negative selection
and p2=0.0046 with negative selection, we obtain the prob-
ability of ham miss-detection in function of the bulkiness
threshold as shown in the Figure 6 (the curves are computed
and shown only for the probabilities that are not bellow the
precision of the computer).
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Figure 6: Determining bulkiness threshold that sat-
isfies a low ham miss-detection requirement: When
the negative selection is applied (the dashed and
doted line), a low ham miss-detection probability
can be achieved with a significantly smaller value of
the bulkiness threshold. This means that a much
smaller initial part of a spam bulk will make it into
inboxes (as compared to the case without negative
selection) before enough evidence is collected for a
safe detection of the remaining messages from the
same bulk.
We see that, in order to achieve very small ham miss-
detection probability, negative selection allows use of about
20 times smaller bulkiness threshold. This directly trans-
lates into approximately 20 times smaller initial portion of
the bulk that will not be filtered until enough evidence is
collected. In the case with negative selection the real proba-
bility of matching between ham emails and unrelated ham or
spam emails might be even smaller the used value p2=0.0046
(we used the upper limit of the confidence interval), the gain
might be even bigger.
2.4 Expected Behavior under Other Spammer
Models
It would be interesting to evaluate the negative selection
under different spammer models, especially under those that
decrease the probability p of matching between emails from
the same bulk (obfuscation usually do not impact the prob-
ability of matching between ham and unrelated ham and
spam emails). In that case the initial part of the bulk that
would not be filtered (using bulkiness threshold that pro-
vides small ham miss-detection) would be approximately in-
creased by factor 1/p.
2.5 Expected Behavior within Other Antispam
Schemes
It seems that the negative selection mechanism can easily
be added (as a module) to other digest-based collaborative
detection schemes, including peer-to-peer schemes and the
schemes that use various additional inputs (e.g. user feed-
back) and algorithms as opposed to a simple counting of
bulkiness. As the negative selection mechanism achieves its
effect through the decrease of unwanted matching between
the digests from unrelated emails, its benefit should hold
when it is used within any digest-based collaborative detec-
tion scheme.
3. CONCLUSION
In this paper we demonstrate how by use of the negative
selection algorithm the unwanted random matching between
unrelated emails may by decreased at least by an order of
magnitude, while preserving the same good matching be-
tween the emails from the same bulk. We also show how
this translates into an order of magnitude (at least) less
undetected bulky spam emails, under the same ham miss-
detection requirements. Moreover, it seems that a use of
multiple digests per email and the negative selection mech-
anism could be beneficial for any digest-based collaborative
spam detection scheme.
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